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InTroduCTIon
As a creature of contract, arbitration is an alternative for parties who 
wish to settle disputes outside of the judicial system.2 Yet, parties often 
attempt to bring claims they agreed to arbitrate into the judicial system 
instead of honoring the arbitration agreement. It is not surprising nor 
shocking for parties to an arbitration agreement to seek relief before the 
courts. In fact, there are many instances in which resorting to the courts 
1 American University Washington College of Law, J.D. Candidate 2013.
2 AlAn reDFern & mArtIn hunter, lAW AnD prActIce oF InternAtIonAl commercIAl 
ArbItrAtIon 1 (2004).
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may be the only viable option to help the arbitral procedure.3 In other 
instances, if the arbitration agreement fails to cover an issue that is at 
dispute between the parties, it is perfectly legitimate for the aggrieved 
party to seek redress within the judicial system. Unfortunately, some 
parties often use and abuse of the judicial system in attempt to bypass 
their arbitral duties. Be it to obtain a more favorable outcome or to resort 
to dilatory tactics and hinder the overall resolution of the dispute, such 
methods should be strongly discouraged by the courts for they attack 
the very efficacy of the arbitral process.
Efficacy and dilatory tactics lie at the heart of the debate regard-
ing whether courts should issue stay of proceedings or dismissal or 
proceedings. Whereas the question presents little interest on its face, 
the consequences of choosing one rather than the other may severely 
impact the conduct of the arbitration. Usually, such question arises 
when a party files a claim covered by an arbitration agreement before 
a court. The opposing party—wanting to arbitrate the dispute as agreed 
upon—will often respond by submitting a motion to dismiss or stay 
the proceedings to compel the other party to arbitrate. Such a question 
is theoretically disposed of under section 3 of the Federal Arbitration 
Act (hereinafter “FAA”).4 Yet, many circuit courts continue to disagree 
on how to approach requests to stay or dismiss litigation.5 Specifically, 
courts of appeal disagree on the practice of issuing a stay in lieu of a 
3 Parties must have recourse to the courts when they seek to compel arbitration, 
nominate arbitrators, seek interim measures, or enforce an award. In all the enumerated 
situations, the courts are there to help enforce the parties’ intent to arbitrate their 
dispute.
4 Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-307 (West). The FAA is U.S. 
federal law that covers arbitration and arbitration proceedings. Individual states also 
have state specific arbitration laws that apply to state related arbitration proceedings. 
This paper focuses specifically on motions to stay arbitration and motions to dismiss 
arbitration in federal courts as governed by the FAA; it will not discuss state arbitration 
laws or state-federal conflict of laws.
5 See 9 U.S.C.A. § 3 (West & Supp. 2011) (mandating courts to issue a stay of 
litigation when a party motions to stay proceedings and compel arbitration); see also 9 
U.S.C.A. § 16 (West) (stating that a court issued stay of litigation on a motion to stay 
or dismiss is non-appealable).
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dismissal,6 some courts interpreting § 3 of the FAA as a strict obligation 
to order stays while other circuits interpret § 3 as allowing discretion to 
issue either dismissals or stays.
This Article argues that courts should interpret § 3 of the FAA as a 
strict mandate to only issue stays. It reasons that the plain language of the 
FAA, congressional intent, and the potential for undue burden on a party 
trying to enforce a valid arbitration agreement favor such an outcome. 
First, Part II of this Article will provide background with respect to legis-
lative and jurisprudential practice of dismissing or staying proceedings. It 
will also describe the circuit court split as well as shed some light on the 
underlying justifications that animate both sides. Part III will then analyze 
and argue in favor of issuing stays rather than a dismissal, and how such 
a position is the only outcome that truly satisfies the FAA’s statutory lan-
guage, congressional intent, and the overarching objectives of arbitration.
I. Background
The FAA refers specifically to suits or proceedings brought before a 
court in the United States.7 Its objective was to overcome historical hostil-
ity toward arbitration and create a favorable environment for parties to 
choose this means of dispute resolution mechanism in contractual agree-
ments.8 Congress also intended for the FAA to allow parties to quickly, 
6 Showmethemoney Check Cashers, Inc. v. Williams, 27 S.W.3d 361, 365 (Ark. 
2000); Anthony v. Kaplan, 918 S.W.2d 174, 177 (Ark. 1996); Birkey Design Group, 
Inc. v. Egle Nursing Home, Inc., 687 A.2d 256, 258 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997); see also 
Richard A. Bales and Melanie A. Goff, An Analysis of an Order to Compel Arbitration: 
To Dismiss or Stay?, 115 Penn st. l. rev. 539 (Winter 2011) (addressing a circuit split 
on the question of whether courts “must stay” or “may dismiss” a motion to stay or 
dismiss arbitration in conjunction with a motion to compel arbitration); Angelina M. 
Petti, Judicial Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements: The Stay-Dismissal Dichotomy 
of FAA § 3, 34 hofstra l. rev. 565-92 (2005) (addressing the circuit court split on the 
question of whether courts should stay or dismiss under FAA § 3).
7 9 U.S.C.A. § 3.
8 Id.; see Accenture LLP v. Spreng, 647 F.3d 72, 74 (2d Cir. 2011) (“Congress 
enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) to reverse the longstanding judicial 
hostility to arbitration agreements that had existed at English common law and had 
been adopted by American courts. The FAA’s provisions manifest a liberal federal 
policy favoring arbitration agreements.” (citations and quotations omitted)). Section 
16 of the FAA “furthers [the FAA’s] aim of eliminating barriers to arbitration by 
promoting appeals from orders barring arbitration and limiting appeals from orders 
directing arbitration.” Ermenegildo Zegna Corp. v. Zegna, 133 F.3d 177, 180 (2d 
Cir.1998) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)).
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efficiently, and effectively pursue arbitration proceedings.9 Section 3 of 
the FAA furthers these objectives by mandating that courts stay proceed-
ings that should be in arbitration.10 Specifically, the FAA provides that if 
any suits which are brought into any U.S. court relate to claims that have 
been agreed to be arbitrated, that court “shall . . . stay the trial of the action 
until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the 
agreement.”11
Congress has generally favored efficient arbitration proceedings and 
shown explicit preference to granting a stay to proceed with arbitra-
tion.12 In enacting the FAA, Congress was also serious about limiting 
judicial interference with arbitration proceedings. In fact, Congress 
explicitly provided in the FAA that all final decisions are appealable 
except those compelling arbitration or a stay of any action.13 This shows 
that Congress preferred a stay of judicial proceedings (or an order com-
pelling arbitration) to dismissal. The difference between the two turns 
on their appealability. Whereas stays—in a large number of scenarios—
are not appealable, dismissals are.14 By showing a preference for the 
former, Congress intended to avoid bogging down parties under a long 
appeals process.
9 See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 85 (2000) 
(explaining that the policy behind the FAA favoring arbitration agreements also 
included moving parties through proceedings as quickly and efficiently as possible).
10 9 U.S.C.A. § 3.
11 Id.
12 See S. Rep. No. 536, 68th. Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1924) (reasoning, in favor of the 
FAA, that society wants to speedily and efficiently settle disputes without the large cost 
of litigation, and have a way to enforce written arbitration agreements); see also Brief 
for Respondent at 13, Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985) (No. 83-
1708), 1984 WL 566049 (arguing that the supreme court does not need to examine or 
rely on legislative history because the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous 
and that following a plain reading would not lead to an absurd or unreasonable result 
or lead to an outcome at odds with the statute).
13 9 U.S.C.A. § 16.
14 Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 259-260 (1992); see Green Tree Fin. Corp.-
Alabama, 531 U.S. at 86 (explaining that § 16(a)(3) provides for the appeal of final 
decisions because of the longstanding understanding that a final decision effectively 
the “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing more for the court to do but 
execute the judgment. ”); see also Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. 
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 26 (1983) (discussing the court decision to accord “final decision” its 
ordinary meaning because the FAA does not specifically defines the term in arbitration 
context “moreover, state courts, as much as federal courts, are obliged to grant stays of 
litigation under § 3 of the Arbitration Act.”).
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Although it has not directly addressed the question of whether district 
courts should be allowed to dismiss suits or claims on their discretion, the 
U.S. Supreme Court has affirmed the general intent of Congress to pre-
serve the efficiency of arbitration proceedings and avoid undue delay.15 
Yet, circuit courts remain split on this issue; on one end are those that 
mandate a stay and on the other those that allow district courts discretion 
to dismiss16—although the circuit split is not completely clear.17
A. The Supreme Court’s Interpretation of Section 3 of the FAA
The Supreme Court has not directly resolved the question of 
whether lower courts must issue a stay under § 3 or if they have discre-
tion to dismiss. However, in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, the 
Court explained that in drafting section 3, Congress intended to enforce 
private agreements and to encourage “efficient and speedy dispute 
resolution.”18 The Supreme Court’s view on § 16 of the FAA is helpful 
in illuminating its understanding of § 3. The Court in Green Tree Fin. 
Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph held that § should be read plainly and that 
affirming a motion to compel arbitration and then dismissing a motion 
to stay proceedings is a final judgment under that section.19 Green Tree 
solidifies a general trend of the Court favoring arbitration and a plain 
reading of the FAA; however it does not specifically address the question 
15 See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985) (explaining 
Congress’ intent in enacting the FAA was to enforce private agreements and to promote 
speedy dispute resolution); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 
395, 404 (1967) (supporting a holding that federal courts can only consider issues 
relating to the making and performance of an arbitration agreement and not on other 
issues covered by the arbitration agreement the court argued that “[i]n so concluding, 
we not only honor the plain meaning of the statute but also the unmistakably clear 
congressional purpose that the arbitration procedure, when selected by the parties to a 
contract, be speedy and not subject to delay and obstruction in the courts.”).
16 See infra Part II.B-C.
17 See infra Part II.D.
18 Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 470 U.S. at 221 (White, J., concurring) (highlighting 
that the “heavy presumption should be that the arbitration and the lawsuit will each 
proceed in its normal course”).
19 Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama, 531 U.S. at 85 (“[T]he FAA’s policy favoring 
arbitration agreements and its goal of [moving] the parties to an arbitrable dispute 
out of court and into arbitration as quickly and easily as possible.” (quotations and 
citations omitted)); id. at 88-89 (“Certainly the plain language of the statutory text [of 
§ 16] does not suggest that Congress intended to incorporate . . . [other] distinctions.”).
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of whether it is mandatory for courts to issue a stay on a motion to stay 
or dismiss proceedings under § 3.20
In perhaps what is the closet ruling on § 3, in Shearson/Am. Exp., 
Inc. v. McMahon, the Court, in dicta, stated that § 3 “provides that a 
court must stay its proceedings if it is satisfied that an issue before it 
is arbitrable under the agreement.”21 The Supreme Court has expressed 
that the FAA should be read plainly, and that the impetus behind § 3 and 
other parts of the act was to enforce contractual agreements and make 
arbitration proceedings as efficient and speedy as possible; although it 
has not directly addressed the circuit split over § 3.22
B. Circuits that Allow District Courts Discretion to Dismiss 
Proceedings
Despite the Supreme Court favoring a plain reading of the FAA, 
many circuit courts have allowed lower courts the discretion to dismiss 
claims rather than mandate a stay.23 In a recent ruling on a contractual 
dispute between a dialysis center and a medical management firm, the 
First Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to dismiss rather than 
stay the suit stating that “[t]he district court had the discretion to do so 
20 Id. at 82 (“In this case we first address whether an order compelling arbitration 
and dismissing a party’s underlying claims is a “final decision with respect to an 
arbitration” within the meaning of § 16(a)(3) of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 
§ 16(a)(3), and thus is immediately appealable pursuant to that Act.”).
21 Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987) (deciding 
whether claims brought under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) are arbitrable under the FAA); see 
also Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. at 26 (“Moreover, 
state courts, as much as federal courts, are obliged to grant stays of litigation under § 
3 of the Arbitration Act.”).
22 See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama, 531 U.S. at 85, 88-89. Although the Supreme 
Court is discussing § 16 of the FAA and not § 3, the same rationale for a plain reading 
should apply to § 3. The fact that Congress used the well established statutory term 
“shall” in § 3 and declines to indicate any language that would grant district courts 
discretion to dismiss a motion to stay leads to a strong argument that if faced with this 
question the Supreme Court would opt for a plain reading of § 3 like it did for § 16 in 
Green Tree.
23 Dialysis Access Ctr. v. RMS Lifeline, Inc., 638 F.3d 367 (1st Cir. 2011); see Choice 
Hotels Int’l, Inc. v. BSR Tropicana Resort, Inc., 252 F.3d 707, 709-10 (4th Cir. 2001) 
(“Notwithstanding the terms of § 3, however, dismissal is a proper remedy when all of 
the issues presented in a lawsuit are arbitrable.”); Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 
975 F.2d 1161, 1164 (5th Cir.1992); Green v. Ameritech Corp., 200 F.3d 967, 973 (6th 
Cir. 2000).
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upon finding that all claims before it were arbitrable.”24 The Fifth Circuit 
as well as the Sixth, mirroring the interpretation of the First Circuit, 
have consistently held that “[i]f all of the issues raised before the district 
court are arbitrable, dismissal of the case is not inappropriate.”25 Courts 
have argued that staying proceedings serves no purpose and that any 
future post-arbitration remedies are limited to a review of the award, 
and therefore, retaining jurisdiction is not important.26
C. Circuits that Mandate that District Courts Stay Proceedings
Many circuits have read § 3 as a mandate to issue a stay and denying 
courts discretion to dismiss.27 In a contractual dispute between a pipefit-
ter and a refinery over alleged discrimination, wrongful discharge, and 
other civil wrongs that was tried on appeal in the Third Circuit in Lloyd 
v. HOVENSA, LLC., the Court reversed the district court’s dismissal of 
the refinery’s motion to stay proceedings pending arbitration, stating 
that the “plain language of § 3 affords a district court no discretion to 
24 Dialysis Access Ctr., 638 F.3d at 372-73 (articulating a clear holding that district 
courts have “discretion to [dismiss the claim,] finding that all claims before it were 
arbitrable.”).
25 Pleasant v. Houston Works USA, 236 F. App’x 89, 93 (5th Cir. 2007). See also 
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc, 975 F.2d at 1164 ; Fedmet Corp. v. M/V BUYALYK, 194 
F.3d 674, 678 (5th Cir. 1999) (“Although the express terms of § 3 provide that a stay 
is mandatory upon a showing that the opposing party has commenced suit upon any 
issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration . . . , we 
have interpreted this language to mean only that the district court cannot deny a stay 
when one is properly requested. This rule, however, was not intended to limit dismissal 
of a case in the proper circumstances. If all of the issues raised before the district 
court are arbitrable, dismissal of the case is not inappropriate.” (citations omitted)); 
see Ameritech Corp., 200 F.3d at 973 (holding that a district court can dismiss a claim 
rather than stay).
26 See Service, Inc. v. Sea-Land of Puerto Rico, Inc., 636 F. Supp. 750, 757 (D.P.R. 
1986) (explaining that once all the issues in an action are deemed arbitrable, there is 
no reason for the court to retain jurisdiction by staying the action).
27 Salim Oleochemicals v. M/V SHROPSHIRE, 278 F.3d 90, 93 (2d Cir. 2002); 
Lloyd v. HOVENSA, L.L.C., 369 F.3d 263 (3d Cir. 2004); Adair Bus Sales, Inc. v. 
Blue Bird Corp., 25 F.3d 953, 955 (10th Cir. 1994); see LaPrade v. Kidder Peabody 
& Co., Inc., 146 F.3d 899, 902 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“Section 3 empowers a district court 
only to stay an action, leaving to the claimant the choice of arbitrating the claims or 
abandoning them.”).
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dismiss a case . . . .”28 Similarly, in Klay v. All Defendants, the Eleventh 
Circuit, in a protracted dispute between a doctor and various health 
maintenance organizations, stated that “[f]or arbitrable issues, the lan-
guage of section 3 indicates that the stay is mandatory.”29 Additionally, 
the Seventh Circuit has held that dismissal is not an option where a valid 
arbitration agreement exists and the issues fall within the scope of that 
agreement .30 Such courts have generally found inspiration in the liberal 
policy in favor of arbitration as well as the plain language of § 3.31
28 See HOVENSA, L.L.C., 369 F.3d at 269 (“In accordance with the Supreme 
Court’s instruction in Green Tree, we apply the plain language of the statutory text in 
interpreting the FAA. Here, the plain language of § 3 affords a district court no discretion 
to dismiss a case where one of the parties applies for a stay pending arbitration. The 
directive that the Court “shall” enter a stay simply cannot be read to say that the Court 
shall enter a stay in all cases except those in which all claims are arbitrable and the 
Court finds dismissal to be the preferable approach. On the contrary, the statute clearly 
states, without exception, that whenever suit is brought on an arbitrable claim, the 
Court “shall” upon application stay the litigation until arbitration has been concluded.” 
(citations omitted)).
29 See Klay v. All Defendants, 389 F.3d 1191, 1204 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Shearson/
Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987)). The question presented in 
this case was whether the district court abused its discretion under § 3 in dismissing a 
motion to stay litigation on nonarbitrable claims. The Court of Appeals held that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion because the claims were nonarbitrable and 
did not fall under § 3. Although not fully on point, the Eleventh Circuit was clear that 
if all claims are arbitrable, as per the requirements of § 3, then a stay is mandatory.
30 Volkswagen Of Am., Inc. v. Sud’s Of Peoria, Inc., 474 F.3d 966, 971 (7th Cir. 
2007) (“For arbitrable issues, a § 3 stay is mandatory.”); Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby 
Ins. Co., 581 F.2d 137, 142 (7th Cir.1978) (“If the agreement to arbitrate is valid the 
court has no further power or discretion to address the issues raised in the complaint 
but must order arbitration . . . ”).
31 Green v. SuperShuttle Int’l, Inc., 653 F.3d 766 (8th Cir. 2011) (Shepherd, J., 
Concurring) (“Nothing in the statute gives the court discretion to dismiss the action 
when all of the issues in the case are arbitrable. Moreover, when Congress uses the 
word “shall,” it normally creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion. 
Although this rule of statutory construction is not absolute, no language in § 3 
indicates a contrary legislative intent.”(citations and internal quotations omitted)); 
Salim Oleochemicals v. M/V SHROPSHIRE, 278 F.3d 90, 93 (2d Cir. 2002) (“District 
courts should continue to be mindful of this liberal federal policy favoring arbitration 
agreements when deciding whether to dismiss an action or instead to grant a stay.” 
(citations omitted)).
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D. Splits Within the Split
The split between the Circuits is not as clean as it would seem, 
where some courts have issued vague and ambiguous holdings that fail 
to clearly delineate for district courts to follow.32 Other Circuits have 
explicitly favored a stay over a dismissal without mandating that dis-
trict courts issue a stay.33 In yet another interpretation, the Tenth Circuit 
has taken the position that when a party petitions for a stay, it must be 
granted; however if a party motions for a dismissal the court is not out 
of order granting that dismissal.34
The Fourth Circuit has confused and generated contradictory case 
law that highlights the need for Supreme Court clarification. In BSR 
Tropicana Resort, Inc., the Fourth Circuit held that “[n]otwithstanding 
the terms of section 3, however, dismissal is a proper remedy when all 
of the issues presented in a lawsuit are arbitrable,” thus granting district 
32 SuperShuttle Int’l, Inc., 653 F.3d at 766 (“The FAA generally requires a federal 
district court to stay an action pending an arbitration, rather than to dismiss it.”) 
(emphasis added).
33 Compare Tierra Right of Way Services, Ltd. v. Abengoa Solar Inc., CV-11-00323-
PHX-GMS, 2011 WL 2292007 (D. Ariz. June 9, 2011) (“The Ninth Circuit favors 
a stay over a dismissal. Furthermore, a stay is warranted by the language of the [9 
U.S.C. § 3] . . . ”), and Bushley v. Credit Suisse First Boston, 360 F.3d 1149, 1153 
(9th Cir. 2004) (“Unnecessary delay of the arbitral process through appellate review 
is disfavored.”), with Sparling v. Hoffman Const. Co., Inc., 864 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 
1988) (“[S]ection 3 gives a court authority, upon application by one of the parties, to 
grant a stay pending arbitration, but does not preclude summary judgment when all 
claims are barred by an arbitration clause. Thus, [9 U.S.C. § 3] [does] not limit the 
court’s authority to grant a dismissal . . .” (citing Martin Marietta Aluminum, Inc. v. 
General Electric Co., 586 F.2d 143 (9th Cir.1978)).
34 See Adair Bus Sales, Inc. v. Blue Bird Corp., 25 F.3d 953, 955 (10th Cir. 
1994) (holding that, under §3, the proper course when a party motions for a stay of 
proceedings is to issue a stay). Compare Parrish v. Valero Retail Holdings, Inc., 727 
F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1281 (D.N.M. 2010) (“The Tenth Circuit has cautioned that, when 
one of the parties petitions the court to stay an action pending compulsory arbitration, 
the mandatory language of 9 U.S.C. § 3 is binding, and it is error for the court to 
dismiss the action.”), with THI of New Mexico at Las Cruces, L.L.C. v. Fox, 727 F. 
Supp. 2d 1195, 1206 (D.N.M. 2010) (“When, however, the party seeking to compel 
arbitration asks the court for dismissal, and there is no evidence in the record of any 
party requesting a stay, it is not error for the district court to dismiss the case.”), and 
Armijo v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 72 F.3d 793, 797 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that 
a district court was not in error in granting a motion to dismiss and compel arbitration 
when there was no record of any request for a stay).
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courts discretion to dismiss claims.35 However, in Adkins v. Labor 
Ready, Inc., the Fourth Circuit stated that the stay-of-litigation provision 
in section 3 is mandatory and therefore “[a] district court . . . has no 
choice but to grant a motion to compel arbitration where a valid arbitra-
tion agreement exists and the issues in a case fall within its purview.”36 
Although Adkins was dealing with a motion to compel arbitration and 
BSR Tropicana Resort, Inc. dealt with a motion to dismiss, the reliance 
on the text of § 3 in reaching contradictory conclusions is troubling.37
II. Section 3 of the FAA mandates Stay rather than Dismissals of 
Proceedings
Although each circuit has individual trends, the majority of circuits 
tend to favor the issuing of stays and have made it expressly clear that 
district courts should issue stays whenever the arbitration clause is 
valid and the claim falls within the clause’s scope. The Supreme Court 
seems to agree with that trend although it has not officially ruled on the 
issue. If the Supreme Court were to rule on whether district courts have 
the discretion to dismiss under § 3 it should hold that courts must stay 
motions to stay or dismiss when the disputes come under the purview 
of a valid arbitration agreement. The three most compelling reasons for 
federal courts to stay proceedings rather than dismissing them are: first, 
the plain language of § 3 mandates a stay, second, Congress favored a 
stay over a dismissal when drafting the FAA, and third, a stay prevents 
undue delay and excessive litigation in resolving disputes.
A. The Plain Reading of the FAA favors Stays in lieu of Dismissals
The plain reading of the text of § 3 mandates that district courts 
issue a stay of proceedings.38 The word “shall” leaves little room for 
35 Hotels Int’l, Inc. v. BSR Tropicana Resort, Inc., 252 F.3d 707, 709-10 (4th Cir. 
2001).
36 Adkins v. Labor Ready, Inc., 303 F.3d 496, 500 (4th Cir. 2002). See B. Fleet Co., 
Inc. v. Aspen Ins. UK Ltd., 743 F. Supp. 2d 575, 582 (W.D. Va. 2010) (“Under the 
[FAA], a court is required to stay ‘any suit or proceeding’ pending the arbitration of 
‘any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration.”).
37 Adkins 303 F.3d at 499; Hotels Int’l, Inc 252 F.3d at 709.
38 Lloyd v. HOVENSA, L.L.C., 369 F.3d 263, 269 (3d Cir. 2004) (interpreting § 3 
to mean that in cases involving arbitration claims, courts are required to stay litigation 
pending a final arbitration decision).
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judicial interpretation.39 By being so explicit in the wording of the stat-
ute, Congress tried to take any decision out the court’s hands.40 With the 
plain meaning of the statute, courts should not have to look to the intent 
of Congress in making any determination regarding § 3.41
In general, a court may look outside the plain wording of the stat-
ute for help in understanding and interpreting the language in several 
restricted instances.42 The three primary instances are: first, if the lan-
guage of the statute is unclear or ambiguous43; second, if following the 
language or wording would lead to an absurd or unreasonable result if 
applied44; and third, if following the statute literally would “bring about 
an end completely at variance with the statute. . . .”45 The language in § 
3 is clear and unambiguous and does not fall into any of the above cat-
egories; federal courts should stay all motions to stay litigation pending 
arbitration as per § 3’s clear meaning.46
39 9 U.S.C.A. § 3; Angelina M. Petti, supra note 4, at 584 (2005) (explaining that 
the clear and precise language of § 3, specifically referring to the word “shall,” does 
not allow “courts leeway to dismiss a case where on of the parties applies for a stay 
pending arbitration.”).
40 Volkswagen Of Am., Inc. v. Sud’s Of Peoria, Inc., 474 F.3d 966, 971 (7th Cir. 
2007) (pointing out that the plain meaning of § 3 suggests that courts must stay the 
entire case-not just a part of it whenever there is an arbitrable issue).
41 Green v. SuperShuttle Int’l, Inc., 653 F.3d 766, 766 (8th Cir. 2011) (Shepherd, J., 
Concurring) (“Nothing in the statute gives the court discretion to dismiss the action 
when all of the issues in the case are arbitrable. Moreover, when Congress uses the 
word “shall,” it normally creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion. 
Although this rule of statutory construction is not absolute, no language in § 3 indicates 
a contrary legislative intent.”) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
42 Brief for Respondent supra note 14, at 13; Angelina M. Petti, supra note 4, at 583 
(2005) (arguing that courts should only look beyond the plain meaning of a statute if 
it produces a result demonstrably at odds with the intent of the drafters).
43 See United States v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 278 U.S. 269, 278 (1929) (arguing 
against using certain legislative history that would have benefited one of the parties 
the court held that “ . . . where the language of an enactment is clear, and construction 
according to its terms does not lead to absurd or impracticable consequences, the 
words employed are to be taken as the final expression of the meaning intended.”).
44 United States v. American Trucking Associations, 310 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1940) 
(“When [the] meaning [of a statute] has led to absurd or futile results . . . this Court 
has looked beyond the words to the purpose of the act.”).
45 See United Steel Workers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201-02 (1979) (holding that 
parts of a statute regarding affirmative action that would bring about an end completely 
at variance to the purpose of the statute “must be rejected”).
46 See Brief for Respondent supra note 14, at 13.
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B. Congressional Intent Favors Orders Issuing Stays in lieu of 
Dismissals
Allowing courts discretion to dismiss does little to advance the 
policy behind the FAA, and in fact goes against the intended outcome of 
the legislation.47 The policy behind the FAA, as previously mentioned, 
is to reverse the historical animosity toward arbitration, grant parties the 
choice on how to settle their disputes, and create an environment that 
furthers efficient arbitration.48 Dismissing a suit not only allows par-
ties to continue litigation in the judicial system, but also forces them 
to reestablish jurisdiction post-arbitration.49 Clearing the court’s docket 
of disputes that it cannot adjudicate creates harm for the parties that 
outweighs the benefit it provides to the courts.
C. Stays of Proceedings Prevent Undue Delay and Excessive 
Litigation
Granting courts the discretion to dismiss will allow parties to con-
tinue in lengthy appeals processes.50 Sections 3 and 16 of the FAA were 
drafted to circumvent the lengthy appeals process and allow parties 
to resolve their disputes through arbitration.51 When a motion to stay 
litigation pending arbitration is dismissed, it becomes a final judgment 
47 See Angelina M. Petti, supra note 4, at 591 (2005) (formulating that dismissing a 
motion to stay will deprive parties the ability to proceed directly to arbitration).
48 See S. Rep. No. 536, 68th. Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1924) (noting that arbitration 
agreements, historically, were ineffectual and often left one party with no adequate 
remedy to enforce the agreement); Accenture LLP v. Spreng, 647 F.3d 72, 74 (2d Cir. 
2011).
49 See Angelina M. Petti, supra note 4, at 587 (2005) (arguing that a stay is more 
appropriate than a dismissal because it preserves the court’s authority over issues 
that may arise during the arbitration and allows them to retain jurisdiction for post-
arbitration proceedings). But see Richard A. Bales, supra note 4 at 555 (2011) 
(arguing that judicial involvement in arbitration proceedings should be limited and 
that continued judicial supervision may invite parties to file motions thus delaying the 
arbitration proceeding).
50 See Halah Touryalai, Motion To Dismiss In Arbitration? Not So Fast, Registered 
Rep. (Jan 8, 2009 5:15 PM), available at http://registeredrep.com/news/motion_to_
dismiss_0108/ (“Theodore G. Eppenstein, a New York-based securities attorney says 
motions to dismiss are an area of great abuse by broker/dealers. “They have slowed 
down plaintiffs cases,” he says. Eppenstein says he’s been handling one specific 
arbitration case since 2005 due to four motions to dismiss filed by the responding 
party. “The whole concept of arbitration is to be able to have a hearing,” he says.”).
51 See S. Rep. No. 536, 68th. Cong., 1st Sess., 2-3 (1924).
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subject to the appeals process. A stay on the other hand is an interlocu-
tory order that is not subject to the appeals process.52 The party whose 
stay was rejected must either continue to proceed with the litigation or 
file an appeal to have the dismissal overturned, which will cost time and 
money. Quite cynically, it behooves a plaintiff to engage in a lengthy 
appeals process when it refuses to submit the dispute to arbitration. The 
subsequent appeals process from a dismissal, although potentially bene-
ficial to some, draws out litigation, increases costs, and goes against the 
contractual agreement of the parties.53 By mandating that courts issue 
a stay in all proceedings that satisfy the standard of § 3, the Supreme 
Court would not only clear up confusion but also reduce the time parties 
spend in court prior to arbitration.
ConClusIon
Should the Supreme Court grant certiorari, it should hold that dis-
trict courts must stay instead of dismiss proceedings. The plain read-
ing of § 3 mandates a stay and provides little room for courts to have 
52 See infra Part II; Angelina M. Petti, supra note 4, at 589-90 (2005).
53 See Angelina M. Petti, supra note 4, at 590 (2005) (commenting on the fact 
that allowing parties to continue in the appeals process by denying a motion to stay 
contravenes the purpose of the FAA to promote speedy dispute resolution and denies 
one of the parties the ability to enforce the arbitration agreement). But see Richard A. 
Bales, supra note 4, at 555-56 (2011) (arguing that allowing courts to dismiss rather 
than stay would decrease litigation by denying parties to the arbitration to file motions 
during the arbitration proceedings as no court would have supervisory jurisdiction 
over the claim); id. at 557 (noting that allowing courts to dismiss would lead to a 
subsequent appeal but that arbitration is not completely foreclosed upon). Richard 
Bales and Melanie Goff do raise two important issues in their argument against 
Angelina Petti’s reasoning for mandating a stay. The first is that the lack of judicial 
oversight denies the parties a forum for motions outside of the arbitration proceeding 
thus protecting the parties from undue delay. The second argument for allowing courts 
to dismiss is that a final appealable order allows a second court to reevaluate the 
situation and potentially correct any mistakes thus protecting the parties overall. While 
both important considerations, the authors fail to discuss the issues of undue delay and 
added cost of an appeals process and fail to explain how a dismissal furthers the goal 
of the FAA in promoting speedy and efficient trials. Overall, the underlying argument 
that more judicial involvement in arbitration may play into the current federal court 
litigation / arbitration problem is important and not without merit. However, the plain 
language of § 3 and supporting legislative history make it difficult to see how the 
Supreme Court could grant federal courts the discretion to dismiss claims rather than 
mandate a stay.
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discretion to dismiss. Congress’ favor toward allowing parties to resolve 
disputes through arbitration and ensuring that arbitration proceedings 
are efficient and timely is well documented. Allowing courts the discre-
tion to dismiss proceedings does little to further this objective. Other 
than removing the proceedings from the court’s docket and from the 
judicial sphere, a dismissal can stifle proceedings, increase litigation 
costs, and create an undue delay—precisely what the FAA was meant 
to combat.
